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CASE NOTES

EQUITY-INJUNCTION WILL ISSUE TO ENJOIN NEGRO ORGANIZATION
FROM INTERFERING WITH RELATION BETWEEN A RACIALLY DISCRIMINATING COMPANY AND ITS CUSTOMERS.

Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of the
Congress of Racial Equality (D.D.C. 1962)
Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant, an organization engaged in a
campaign to secure employment for Negroes, from distributing to plaintiff's customers several hundred thousand stamps bearing the words,
"We believe in merit hiring." The recipients of these stamps were to
be 'requested to affix them to the stubs of the plaintiff's bills when the
latter were returned in connection with payments. It was found that such
action would make it impossible to process the stubs in the calculating
machines and would result in confusion and havoc in plaintiff's billing and
accounting operations. The District Court, on motion by defendant to
dismiss the amended complaint, held that the complaint stated a valid
cause of action and an injunction was a proper remedy. The court
further held that the controversy was not a labor dispute within the
scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,' but that, even if it were, plaintiff
was entitled to a preliminary injunction restraining the distribution of
such stamps. Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of
the Congress of Racial Equality, 210 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1962).
Although the court also concerned itself with whether the controversy
involved a labor dispute within the meaning of that term as found in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 2 and whether that Act precluded the issuance
of an injunction, this note will focus solely upon what seems to be the
most perplexing problem, that is, the precise nature of the cause of action
upon which the litigation was grounded.
Combating racial discrimination in employment is presently a most
significant domestic problem. It should be noted that the court in the
present case, concerning the theory upon which its decision was based,
merely stated that:
It is well established that equity may enjoin continuing trespasses,
repeated or irreparable injuries to property, or a course of illegitimate
interference with business activities, if a remedy by an action for
damages
is not adequate. This is one of the traditional functions of
3
equity.
However, an analysis of these theories in relation to the facts of the
instant case shows that the court really went much further than it said
it did.
A common law right to conduct one's business without the wrongful
interference of others has been recognized since as early as the fourteenth
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-113 (1958).
2. Ibid.

3. 210 F. Supp. 418, 419 (D.D.C. 1962).
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century. 4 In the earliest cases, recovery was had where the interference
involved violence, fraud, or defamation.5 The familiar torts of disparagement, unfair competition, malicious prosecution, and deceit developed from
this common basis. The general scope of this area of tort law was broadened
by the decision in Lumley v. Gye,0 which recognized as tortious an intentional, though nonviolent, interference with contractual relations. Such a
rule was extended in Temperton v. Russell7 to cover interference with
prospective, as well as with fixed contractual relations. Moreover, within
a separate line of development, Quinn v. Leatherns introduced the principle
that an action could be brought against a defendant for interfering with
one's trade or calling where the defendant's purpose was to injure the
plaintiff in his trade as opposed to legitimately advancing his own interest.
Today, the outgrowth of such principles has brought about another generic
label, "wrongful interference with the conduct of a business," and such
has been applied to a conglomerate of transactions often including or overlapping the more crystallized torts. With flexible bounds, this cause of
action may offer assistance to any businessman with a grievance which
does not fit within the more familiar molds. It also prevents one from
avoiding liability for a wrongful act which does not fit within the requirements for a traditional cause of action. 9 Although some courts seem
clearly to hold that a general claim of unjustified injury to the business,
credit, and reputation of the plaintiff is enough to bring the case within
the range of interests protected in the name of "conduct of a business," 10
the facts of the instant case are quite unlike those in any previously
reported decision. Here is present the additional element that the customers of the plaintiff are a necessary agent in bringing about the injury.
Thus, it could be contended that the sending of the stamps is nonactionable, since this act, in itself, does not cause any harm to the plaintiff's business. Defendants are in no way pressuring the customers to
affix the stamps to the stubs. Defendants' only act was a suggestion to
plaintiff's customers that if they were displeased with the plaintiff's policy
4. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766, Comment b (1939).

5.Ibid.
6. 2 Ell. & BI. 216, 1 ENG. RUL. CAs. 707 (1853).
7.1 Q.B.715 (1893).
8.[1901] A.C.495.
9.See Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187 (2d
Cir. 1943) (inducement of employees to leave jobs) ; Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn.
145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) (competing for sole purpose of destroying plaintiff's
business); American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 36
N.E.2d 123 (1941) (threatening boycott of association members); Opera On Tour,
Inc. v.Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349 (1941) (ordering stagehands to refuse
to serve plaintiff).
10. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S.
350, 49 S. Ct. 499 (1921) ; Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d
383 (1943) ; Stein v. Schmitz, 21 N.J. Misc. 218, 32 A.2d 844 (1943) ; Ledwith v.
International Paper Co., 64 N.Y.S.2d 810. (Sup. Ct. 1946); Koral v. Savory, Inc.,
168 Misc. 615, 5 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd. 255 App. Div. 856, 7 N.Y.S.2d
995 (1938) ; Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885
(Sup. Ct. 1938); Stebbins v. Edwards, 101 Okla. 188, 224 Pac. 714 (1924)
Riding v. Smith, I Ex. D. 91 (1875).
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of discrimination, they should take the prescribed steps. In all the
previous cases there has been some direct act on the part of defendants to
interfere immediately with the conduct of plaintiffs' business." Thus,
the present court has gone one step further in finding this course of
conduct actionable as an illegitimate interference with business activities.
It is suggested that in expanding the scope of tort liability in the
business area, the Court has either intentionally or inadvertently relied
upon the somewhat mysterious prima facie tort doctrine. As classically
set out in Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., the doctrine is
that "intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of
events to damage another in that person's property or trade, is actionable
if done without just cause or excuse.' 2 Its initial appearance in the United
States was in Aikens v. Wisconsin,13 where the court said: "It has been
considered that prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage
is a cause of' action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may
be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to
escape.' 4 This doctrine has been used as a practical tool enabling courts
to impose punishment for wrongful actions which did not lend themselves
to traditional classification.' 5 Prosser suggests that the important factor
is motive, and the real problem is in balancing the conflicting interests of
the parties, and determining whether the defendant's objective should
prevail at the expense of the damage to the plaintiff; it is ultimately a
question of deciding whether the social value of that objective is sufficient to outweigh the gravity of the interference.' 6 It has also been
proposed that the prima facie tort doctrine is a useful instrument since
litigants need not be denied relief merely because the common law has
not been extended by analogy to fit newly emerging problems. It has been
said that the doctrine has had the effect of motivating the development
of the concept of "no fault without liability" in the tort area.' 7 The
same theory applies to the other causes of action alluded to by the court,
including continuing trespass and irreparable injury to property. Fol11. In addition to cases cited supra note 9, see also Dunshee v. Standard Oil
(competition for sole purpose of destroying
plaintiff's business); Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 Atd. 109 (1935)
(picketing to secure employment of Negroes); Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md.
341, 71 Atl. 962 (1909) (blacklist of labor agitator) ; Wesley v. Native Lumber Co.,
97 Miss. 814, 53 So. 346 (1910) (threatening customers); Van Horn v. Van Horn,
56 N.J.L. 318, 28 At. 669 (1894) (inducing suppliers to boycott plaintiff); Crafter
Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co., Ltd. v. Veitch, [1942] A.C. 435 (convincing suppliers
not to deal with plaintiff).
12. 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (1889).
13. 195 U.S. 194, 25 S. Ct. 3 (1904).
14. 195 U.S. 194, 204, 25 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1904).
15. See Aikens v. Wis., 195 U.S. 194, 255 S. Ct. 3 (1904) ; Imperial Ice Co.
v. Rorsier, 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941) ; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555
(1871); Wilkinson v. Powe, 300 Mich. 275, 1 N.W.2d 539 (1942); Louis Kamn,
Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 Atl. 62 (1934) ; Al Raschid v. News Syndicate
Co., 265 N.Y. 1, 191 N.E. 713 (1934).

Co., 152 Iowa 618, 132 N.W. 371 (1911)

16. PROSSER, TORTS § 5 at p. 23 (2d ed. 1955).

17. Note, 52 COL. L. REv. 503, 513 (1952).
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lowing the Restatement of Torts, 18 the defendant would be liable if the
customers followed its request and pasted the stamps to the stubs, for
the latter act would constitute a trespass and/or a conversion and would be
causally linked to the wrongful act through the intent to have the stamps
placed on the stubs. This does not resemble any traditional tort theory and
appears to be, in effect, an outgrowth of the prima facie tort doctrine.
One of the key issues arising wherever such a theory is applied is
the matter of justification. Liability usually will depend on the ultimate
purpose which defendant is seeking to advance. The earliest cases' 9 dealing
with interference with contractural relations, with their emphasis upon
malice, regarded proof of an improper motive as an essential part of the
plaintiff's cause of action. 20 As the tort became more firmly established,
there was a gradual shift of emphasis; today it is generally agreed that
the intentional interference is prima facie sufficient for liability, and that
the burden of proving that it is "justified" rests upon defendant. 21 According to one view of what factors are necessary in determining privilege, 22 attempts to prevent racial discrimination come within the privilege :23
The question whether such pressure is proper is answered
in the light of the circumstances in which it is exerted, the object
sought to be accomplished by the actor, the degree of coercion involved, the extent of the harm which it threatens, the effect upon
neutral parties drawn into the situation, the effects upon competition,
and the general reasonableness and appropriateness of their pressure
as a means of accomplishing the actor's objective.24
As to how far a group may proceed to combat discrimination in employment, the courts have not been helpful in establishing standards. Occasionally, they have labeled problems as labor disputes, thereby giving the
group the benefits of certain labor legislation. 25 But such a matter is
beyond the scope of the present discussion.
18. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 280 and comment; § 279, comment c (1934): "The
actor will be held to be causally connected if he is a substantial factor in bringing

about harm of the type which he intended to inflict upon the other; the actor is
a substantial factor even if after the event it appears highly extraordinary that
it should have brought about the harm or that the actor's conduct has created a

situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not

responsible."
19. Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 1 ENG. RUL. CAS. 707 (1853); Bowen
v. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 333, 50 L.J.Q.B. 305 (1881); Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q.B. 715,
62 L.J.Q.B. 412 (1893).
20. PROSSR, TORTS § 106 (2d ed. 1955).
21. Ibid.
22. RZSTATMSINT, TORTS § 767 (1939): "In determining whether there is a
privilege to act in the manner stated in § 766, the following are important factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the nature of the expectancy with which his conduct interferes,
(c) the relations between the parties,
(d) the interest sought to be advanced by the actor and
(e) the social interests in protecting the expectancy on the one hand, and the
actor's freedom of action on the other hand.
23. Id., comment on clause (d) at p. 69.
24. Id., comment on clause (a) at pp. 67-68.
25. E.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-113 (1958), which places certain restrictions on the issuance of injunctions in any case involving or growing out of
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Some insight into the attitude of the courts is found in the cases
involving non-labor boycotting and picketing to secure employment for
Negroes. In Green v. Samuelson,28 a Negro group picketed and advocated boycotting of a white merchant in a Harlem area who refused
to hire Negro clerks exclusively. While the court recognized the
right of Negroes, by organization, public meetings, propaganda, and
personal solicitation, to persuade white employers to engage colored employees and to induce their people to confine their trade to those who
accede to their wishes, the court enjoined such action on the theory that
the question was a racial or social one, thus making inapplicable the
rule applying to labor disputes. Implicit in the decision was the warning
that to allow such conduct might easily lead to physical violence and
that such means would not be lawful in order to accomplish the particular
end. In A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson,27 the facts were essentially
similar. The court there also stressed that the problem was a racial one,
not a labor dispute. Supposedly, if defendants had been allowed to
continue their acts, it would have been equally proper for some white
organization to employ the same tactics. This would have created a
substantial danger that race riots and reprisals would have resulted. The
court felt that "a balancing of the advantages to the defendants, as against
the disadvantages to the plaintiff and the social order as a whole, clearly
points to disapproval of the acts complained of."' 28

Both of these cases

were considered in Hughes v. Superior Court.29 There, defendant, a
group organized to improve the status of the Negro, demanded that
Negro clerks be hired at plaintiff's grocery store until the proportion of
Negro clerks to the white clerks approximated the proportion of Negro
to white customers. Upon refusal of this demand and in order to
compel compliance, plaintiff's store was systematically patrolled by pickets
carrying placards. In a suit by the store owner for an injunction, the
state court held for defendants . 0 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, stating:
a labor dispute. See New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 58
S. Ct. 703 (1938) where, in a situation involving picketing by an organization
attempting to secure employment for Negroes, the Court held that the matter was
a labor dispute and was governed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In the instant
case, the court considered whether the matter was a labor dispute and decided that,
even if it were, the requirements for issuing an injunction under the Act were
nevertheless satisfied. 210 F. Supp. 418, 420-421. (D.D.C. 1962).
26. 168 Md. 421, 178 AtI. 109 (1935).
27. 153 Misc. 363, 274 N.Y. Supp. 946 (1934).
28. Id. at 370, 274 N.Y. Supp. at 954.
29. 186 P.2d 756 (Cal. App. 1948).
30. The court stated :
"... it is in accord with sound public policy to permit Negroes, a discriminated
and subjugated group in our society, to picket to attempt to secure equality in
employment practices from those employers who cater to Negro patronage. The
right is granted not because the pickets are members of a minority group, but
because that minority group is economically discriminated against, and is attempting to rectify that condition." Id. at 766.
The court brought out that it depended on the nature of the acts of the Negroes
whether the right to gain employment by such methods would be lost.
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To deny to California the right to ban picketing in the circumstances of this case would mean that there could be no prohibition
of the pressure of picketing to secure proportional employment on
ancestral grounds of Hungarians in Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo,
of Germans in Milwaukee, of Portuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans
in San Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in New York,
and so on through the whole gamut of racial and religious concentrations in various cities .... The differences in cultural traditions

instead of adding flavor and variety to our common citizenry might
well be hardened into hostilities by leave of law. The constitution
does not demand that the element of communication in picketing
prevail over the mischief furthered by its use in these situations. 31
Moreover, the Court expressed the view that "industrial picketing is more
than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality, and
since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind
or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated. ' 32 Thus, it is evident that there has been little success in
attempting to combat racial discrimination through picketing and boycotting. Consequently, one has no difficulty in justifying the court's
attitude toward defendant's action in the instant case. However, where
the court stated that the defendant's activity served no useful object, but
was merely intended to vex and harass the plaintiff,3 3 it seemed to have
lost sight of defendant's purpose in pursuing such a course of action. For
it appears that a very useful object would have been accomplished, namely,
the reduction of racial discrimination in employment. The court might
simply have meant that the means did not justify the end.
As the law stands at present, the few precedents existing in the area
of attempts to combat racial discrimination in employment are not very
encouraging for the Negro. Courts have vaguely asserted that groups
may combine to combat such discrimination, while, at the same time,
they have consistently forbidden effective action aimed at achieving such
a result. In fact, it seems that the concept of racial equality in employment has been relegated to such a secondary position by the courts that,
in a case like the present one, an injunction is granted without specifically
stating the underlying cause of action even though the court is going
further than any court has previously gone in this respect.
It is evident that steps must be taken in this area. Perhaps, if a
court were willing to consider such controversies as labor disputes and
protect them from injunctive relief, an immediate solution might be had.
Although it is unlikely that such an interpretation would alter the result
31. 339 U.S. 460, 464, 70 S. Ct. 718, 721 (1950).
32. Ibid.; see also concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Bakery & Pastry
Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816 (1942).
33. 210 F. Supp. 418, 419 (D.D.C. 1962).
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